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1 Introduction
One of the most important problems of civil litigation is the cost barrier plaintiﬀs
face. This barrier may keep plaintiﬀs from pursuing their case, even if their claim
is legitimate. The problem is obvious under the American cost allocation rule,
where each litigant has to bear its own costs, regardless of who prevails in court.
If the plaintiﬀ’s costs are too high, the option to sue has a negative expected
value. In this case, the threat to sue is not credible and thus is worthless.1 The
legal system is unable to protect the rights of such a plaintiﬀ.
Even under the British or European cost allocation rule - which in general
requires the losing litigant to pay both parties’ costs - a case can easily have a
negative expected value. Consider an amount at stake of 50.000 Euros. The cost
risk a plaintiﬀ faces amounts to about 40.000 Euros.2 The expected value of the
trial is computed as the amount at stake times the probability to prevail, net of
the costs times the probability to loose. If the plaintiﬀ in this example estimates
his probability to prevail to be less than 0.44, then the case has negative expected
value for him. The costs are even higher if the plaintiﬀ expects the ﬁnal decision
to be made only in appeal.
Three diﬀerent kinds of attempts to solve the cost barrier problem can be ob-
served, namely
1Note that this is true even if the option to sue is only considered as a threat in settlement
negotiations, see Bebchuk (1988), (1996), (1998).
2See Rollmann (1999, 203). The costs are regressive, however: For an amount at stake
of 500.000 Euros, the author calculates a cost risk of 125.000 Euros. Rollmann, one of the
founders of the FORIS AG, estimates that about 17.000 lawsuits per year in Germany are not
brought due to this cost risk, though he does not add any remark as to the merits of these
cases.
2• Contingent fees: The prevailing plaintiﬀ pays his attorney a portion of the
proceeds, whereas he pays nothing if he loses the case.3
• Legal Cost Insurance: A potential litigant purchases an insurance against
the ﬁnancial risk of a trial.
• Legal aid: Plaintiﬀ’s of lower income receive a (tax-ﬁnanced) subsidy that
covers at least a part of their costs.4
Legal Cost Insurance is rare in the United States, yet very common in Europe
(in particular in Germany). In some European jurisdictions, such as Germany, it
is well established; in others, such as the UK, it is developing fast. One possible
reason for its limited availability in the US is that the American rule reduces
the risks associated with litigation. Under this rule, risk depends largely on the
decisions of the insured plaintiﬀ, which may be reasonably predictable. As a
result, the American cost allocation rule may not stimulate demand Legal Cost
Insurance.5 Under the British rule, Legal Cost Insurance makes more sense:
the insurer covers a risk (of losing in court) the occurrence of which does not
only depend on decisions of the insured, but also of the those of the judge or
jury (which cannot be foreseen with certainty). Furthermore, the expected cost
at stake may also depend on the defendant’s decisions.
Another reason for the position of Legal Cost Insurance in the US is the
widespread availability of contingent fees. In contrast, these are less familiar
in Europe. This may be due to the diﬃculties of organizing contingent fee
arrangements under the British rule:6 if, under the British rule, a plaintiﬀ pre-
vails, then he has to pay nothing, whereas a contingent fee arrangement would
require him to pay a share of the proceeds to his attorney. In the event of loss,
he has to pay both parties’ costs under the British rule, but nothing under the
contingent fee agreement. This suggests a potential incompatibility between the
British rule and the concept of contingent fees.7
Despite this apparent incompatibility some new ﬁrms in Germany, the ﬁrst
of which was FORIS AG in Berlin, now oﬀer contingent fee arrangements for
plaintiﬀs.8 FORIS initially demanded one half of the client’s returns from trial
or settlement - nowadays, with more competition in this market, FORIS only
3Painter (1995, 626).
4In Germany, legal aid does not cover the opposing attorney’s fees, which still creates a
considerable cost risk for a low-income plaintiﬀ.
5See, however, Kirstein (2000) who analyzes Legal Cost Insurance as a strategic device
rather than as a mean to reallocate risks. This focus explains why even under the American
rule, and even if both the insurer and the insured are assumed to be risk neutral, an insurance
contract can be bilaterally beneﬁcial.
6See Paintner (1995, 631), but also Smith (1992).
7This incompatibility problem diﬀers substantially from the problem that has received
much attention in the literature on contingent fees (under the American rule), namely the
incentives of the attorney; see, e.g., Emons (2000).
8Recall that the German legal system is governed by the British cost allocation rule.
3claims 30 percent.9 In turn, FORIS pays both parties’ costs if the plaintiﬀ
looses in court. FORIS oﬀers to accept cases, only after an evaluation of the
odds, at any stage of the procedure, even if suit has already been brought. The
plaintiﬀ’s attorney still receives his standard fees,10 thus his incentives are not
altered directly by the FORIS contract.11
This paper provides a ﬁrst attempt to analyze this new business idea. We
present a simple model with litigation and settlement, drawing on the literature
on divergent expectations12 and on the credibility of the threat to sue.13 Our
model provides ﬁrst insights into how a FORIS contract (and the opportunity
to make such contracts) inﬂuences the outcome of settlement and the positions
of the litigants involved.
There is a surprising clause in the standard contract FORIS oﬀers to its clients:
the plaintiﬀ is prohibited from revealing to a third party the fact that the
contract has been made. FORIS gives no reason for this clause, but one of
its competitors explains that the existence of such a contract might be due to
thefact that the presence of insurance may act as a signal that the plaintiﬀ is
not suﬃciently convinced of the merits of his case.14 If the judge interprets the
existence of the contract this way, this might damage the plaintiﬀ’s prospects in
court. The eﬀect of a FORIS contract that is governed by this clause is limited:
it only serves as an insurance that shields the plaintiﬀ from the cost risk if the
parties do not reach a settlement and the case proceeds to trial.
However, our model questions the beneﬁts of this clause. We model the impact
of a FORIS contract without this clause on the settlement and trial decisions of
the parties and show that there exists a strategic eﬀect of a FORIS contract: the
settlement result for the plaintiﬀ can be increased. This strategic eﬀect generates
an additional cooperation rent between FORIS and its client.15 Making use of
the non-revelation clause would destroy this chance to attract additional clients.
9Among the now numerous competitors of FORIS AG (see www.foris-ag.de)
in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria are www.juragent-derprozessﬁnanzierer.de,
www.prozessﬁnanzierung.at, www.das-proﬁ.de, www.exactor.de and www.gloria-
prozessﬁnanzierung.de.
10These are determined by the Bundesrechtsanwaltsgeb¨ uhrenordnung (BRAGO).
11Some related developments have begun to emerge in England and Wales, where condi-
tional fees, coupled with Legal Cost Insurance, provide the plaintiﬀ with some protection
against costs. The attorney does not receive a percentage of winnings (as an attorney un-
der the contingent fee system, or as FORIS, does) but a mark-up on hourly costs which
provides some measure of “output based” incentive. See Gravelle/Waterson (1993) and
Rickman/Fenn/Gray (1999).
12The ﬁrst contribution to this approach was Shavell (1982). See also Priest/Klein
(1985), Wittman (1985), Klein (1985), Eisenberg (1990), Stanley/Coursey (1990),
Thomas (1995), Kessler/Meites/Miller (1996).
13See Bebchuk (1988), Bebchuk (1996), Bebchuk (1998) and Kirstein (2000).
14See www.das-proﬁ.de/kuendigung.html. A rather frivolous reason for the non-revelation
clause would be the hypothetical possibility for FORIS to represent both litigants, e.g. if the
defendant brings a counter-suit.
15According to Schelling (1956), a strategic move needs to be communicated in time in
order to have a strategic eﬀect.
4Furthermore, our model shows that this strategic eﬀect can make a FORIS con-
tract attractive for plaintiﬀs for the whole range (from zero to one) of subjective
probabilities to prevail. Therefore, a rational judge is unable to infer from the
existence of a contract the plaintiﬀ’s subjective estimation of his case’s strength.
The reason for this clause clearly warrants further research.
FORIS contracts include other interesting clauses that would merit research, but
are ignored in this paper so as to focus on matters raised above. One particular
example is the clause that allows FORIS (as well as its competitors) to reserve
a veto right if the plaintiﬀ wants to reject a settlement oﬀer by the defendant.
If FORIS carries out this veto, then the plaintiﬀ has to put FORIS in the same
position as if the settlement had been accepted: FORIS collects its share of the
defendant’s oﬀer and does not have to cover any trial costs.
We show that FORIS contracts can be bilaterally beneﬁcial when the veto clause
is not present; and we expect this clause to trigger more settlements rather than
less which would even strengthen our argument. We also omit analysis of the
incentives faced by the plaintiﬀ‘s attorney (though, as noted above, these may
not diﬀer too greatly from those under “typical” funding arrangements), as well
as the idea that defendant’s may also demand FORIS contracts - this kind of
contractual arrangement in not known yet, at least not in Germany.16
2 Analysis of the FORIS contract
2.1 The model
Three players are involved: a plaintiﬀ (P), a defendant (D), and FORIS (F).
All of them are assumed to be risk-neutral. P has a legitimate claim against D,
the value of which is denoted as Y > 0. Litigation costs of both parties add up
to G > 0 if a trial occurs, whereas settlement costs are zero. We assume the
British cost allocation rule: the loser has to pay both parties’ costs.
Both players have subjective probabilities that P wins the trial.17 We denote
the subjective probability of litigant i ∈ {P;D} as qi, with 0 < qi < 1. The
parameters qP and qD are the subjects of comparative statics in the following
sections, whereas Y and G are held ﬁxed throughout.
The interaction takes place in - at most - four steps:
1. P and D negotiate over a settlement. If they agree upon a payment T,
16Painter (1995, 626) mentions the possibility of“reverse” contingent fees; in this case the
defendant’s attorney would receive a share of the amount his client saves if he prevails in
court.
17F and P are assumed to have identical beliefs as to the plaintiﬀ’s chances of prevailing
in court. This assumption does not reﬂect the expertise FORIS may have in evaluating a
case, though it is possiblt that P’s attorney may have provided similar advice. However, this
simpliﬁcation helps to keep the model tractable.
5the game ends and the payoﬀs of P, D, and F are [T,−T,0].
2. P and F bargain over a FORIS contract. If they make a contract then F
commits to covering the litigation costs if P loses at trial.18 In turn, F
receives a share µ ∈]0,1[ of all returns P acquires. Without a contract, F
receives nothing and P has to bear the full litigation costs in case of loss.
3. After the contract stage, P and D may (again) negotiate over a settle-
ment. If they come to an agreement then the payoﬀs are [S,−S,0] with-
out a FORIS contract, and [(1−µ)SF,−SF,µSF] if a FORIS contract has
been made. To keep the analysis simple, we assume the symmetric Nash
bargaining solution (with equal bargaining power) when solving for the
settlement amount.19
4. If no settlement has occurred, P decides whether to proceed to trial or
not. Without a FORIS contract, the expected payoﬀs amount to [qPY −
(1−qP)G,−qD(Y +G),0]. If, on the other hand, a FORIS contract exists,
the payoﬀs are [(1 − µ)qPY,−qD(Y + G),µqPY − (1 − qP)G].
In the following sections, we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of three
diﬀerent versions of this game. The ﬁrst game only consists of stages 3 and 4.
This is equivalent to a situation where FORIS contracts are not available at all.
This game is analyzed in section 2.2.
The second game includes the stages 2, 3, and 4. This models a situation in
which FORIS accepts only customers that have not started to bargain over
settlements yet, which we analyze in section 2.3.
The third game contains the additional stage 1 and is analyzed in section 2.4.
This amendment allows for the analysis of settlement negotiations that take
place even before a FORIS contract has been made.
2.2 No FORIS contracts at all
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events in game 1 which is limited to stages 3
and 4 as described above. The ﬁrst event is the settlement bargaining between
P and D, represented by the rectangle in Figure 1 that is labeled with (P, D).
If the parties come to an agreement, the payoﬀs of P, D and F (who is not
involved yet) are [S,−S,0]. The other payoﬀs can easily be derived, using the
trial technology: if P proceeds to trial, he expects to prevail with probability
qP, which would yield Y . He expects to lose with probability (1 − qP), having
to bear litigation costs G. D expects to lose with probability qD; in this case
18This assumption would be loosened by taking into account the veto clause provided by
the standard FORIS contract.
19Our results would also hold for an asymmetric bargaining situation, as long as the bar-
gaining power is not entirely in the plaintiﬀ’s hands. In this case his position cannot be
improved anymore by a strategic move.
6he has to pay Y + G, and zero otherwise. If P does not proceed to court, all
players get zero payoﬀ.
























[qpY − (1 − qP)G,−qD(Y + G),0]
[S,−S,0]
We start the derivation of subgame perfect equilibria with the analysis of the
trial stage. If settlement has failed, P will only proceed to trial if the case has






If condition (1) is fulﬁlled, then D faces an expected loss of −qD(Y +G) if he fails
to settle. A settlement payment S is hence acceptable for him if S < qD(Y +G).
P’s expected payoﬀ is qPY − (1 − qP)G if no settlement occurs and the parties
meet in court. Thus, P accepts a settlement if S > qPY −(1−qP)G. Therefore,
the bargaining range in a PEV case without FORIS contract is
]qPY − (1 − qP)G,qD(Y + G)[ (2)
If this bargaining range is empty, the parties do not come to an agreement, and
P proceeds to court. The condition for this outcome is qPY − (1 − qP)G >
qD(Y + G) or, equivalently,




If, on the other hand, qPY − (1 − qP)G < qD(Y + G), then the bargaining
range is non-empty and the parties agree upon a settlement. Applying the
7symmetric Nash bargaining solution, the predicted bargaining result is ˆ S =
0.5[qPY − (1 − qP)G] + 0.5qD(Y + G) or, equivalently,
ˆ S = 0.5[(qp + qD)(Y + G) − G] (4)
If, on the other hand, qPY −(1−qP)G < 0 then the case has negative expected
value (NEV).20 If settlement fails, then the payoﬀs of P and D are zero. Thus,
the bargaining range is ]0,0[= ∅. Therefore, P’s threat to sue is not credible. D
is not motivated to accept a positive settlement result. This leads to our ﬁrst
result:
Result 1: In Game 1, given Y,G,qP and qD, the parties P and D
• meet in court if, and only if, qP > qD + G/(Y + G),
• come to a settlement ˆ S if, and only if, G/(Y + G) < qP <
qD + G/(Y + G),
• neither go to court, nor settle if, and only if, G/(Y + G) > qP
Figure 2 presents the three possible outcomes of Game 1, depending on the
parameters qD and qP. The small diagonal line represents condition (3), the
horizontal line represents condition (1). In the upper left triangle, the subgame
perfect equilibrium path is (no settlement, trial). In the lower rectangle, the
case has NEV and the equilibrium path is (no settlement, no trial). In the upper
right area, the parties come to a settlement payment ˆ S in equilibrium.
2.3 FORIS contracts before settlement negotiations
To create Game 2, we now add the contract stage. Figure 3 shows the sequence
of events in Game 2 which consists of stages 2, 3, and 4. The ﬁrst event is the
bargaining over a contract between P and F, represented by the rectangle in
Figure 3 that is labeled with (F, P). If F and P do not make a contract, the
game continues as game 1 (which has been analyzed in 2.2).
2.3.1 The subgame with FORIS contracts
If a contract has been made, this fact is revealed to D. Note that this violates
the clause in the standard FORIS contract according to which the plaintiﬀ is
prohibited from revealing the existence of the contract to a third party. It is
the purpose of this section to show that the revelation of this information to the
defendant has a strategic impact that creates an (additional) cooperation rent
between F and P.
20For simplicity, we leave ties (such as qPY − (1 − qP)G = 0) out of consideration.




















The settlement negotiations start (represented by the rectangle that is labeled
as P, D). If P and D come to an agreement (the settlement payment is now
denoted as SF), then the payoﬀs of P, D and F are [(1 − µ)SF,−SF,µSF].
The other consequence of a FORIS contract is the modiﬁcation of the payoﬀs
in the trial subgame, as compared to the trial subgame in Game 1: P no longer
worries about the litigation costs, but now he has to share his returns with
F. Hence the (expected) payoﬀs in case of a trial are[(1 − µ)qPY,−qD(Y +
G),µqPY − (1 − qP)G].
As long as µ < 1, a FORIS contract obviously turns each case into a credible
threat, so P will always sue if the parties fail to settle. D faces the expected
loss −qD(Y + G). P expects a gain (1 − µ)qPY in case of a trial, whereas a
settlement brings (1 − µ)SF. Thus, P accepts a settlement payment if (1 −
µ)SF > (1 − µ)qPY or, equivalently, SF > qPY . Therefore, the bargaining
range in the presence of a FORIS contract is
]qPY,qD(Y + G)[ (5)
Due to (1 − qP)G > 0, this interval is a subset of the bargaining range without
FORIS contract, see (2). The FORIS contract results in an upward shift of the
lower boundary of the bargaining range. The parties are predicted to proceed to
court if the bargaining range (5) is empty. This is the case if qPY > qD(Y +G)











































If this “trial condition” holds, then the parties meet in court and the expected
payoﬀs of P, D, and F are [(1 − µ)qPY,−qD(Y + G),µqPY − (1 − qP)G]. If
condition (6) is not fulﬁlled, the parties come to a settlement agreement
ˆ SF = 0.5[(qP + qD)Y + qDG] (7)
Thereby, we have derived our second result:
Result 2: In the subgame of Game 2 where a contract between F
and P has been made, the parties D and P
• meet in court if, and only if, qP > qD(Y + G)/Y ;
• come to a settlement ˆ SF if, and only if, qP < qD(Y + G)/Y .
Note that ˆ SF > ˆ S.21 We denote the diﬀerence as ∆S = ˆ SF − ˆ S = 0.5(1−qP)G.
Figure 4 demonstrates the two possible outcomes of this subgame of Game 2.
21This relation also holds for any other distribution of the settlement rent between P and
D, as long as P’s share is positive.
10The diagonal line represents condition (6). Combinations of qP and qD above
this line lead to a trial, whereas parameters below this line motivate the parties
to come to a settlement.
In comparison with Figure 2 there is no longer a lower rectangle where trial is a
non-credible threat. As explained above, the insurance function of the FORIS
contract ensures that P will always be willing to go to court, which is a necessary
condition to motivate D to accept positive settlement payments.



























2.3.2 Incentives to make a FORIS contract
Now we compare the outcomes of the two possible subgames of Game 2, the one
with a FORIS contract and the one without it, in order to derive the conditions
under which it is mutually beneﬁcial for F and P to make such a contract.
Figure 5 brings together ﬁgure 2 and ﬁgure 4. According to ﬁgure 5, we have
to distinguish ﬁve cases when comparing the two subgames22:
22Note that this analysis is based on the assumption that the amount at stake, Y , is constant.
If, in a comparative static analysis, Y is increased, then the intersection of the two diagonal
lines with the upper boundary of ﬁgure 5 shifts to the right, and the intersection of the
horizontal line shifts downwards. The slope of the shorter diagonal line remains constant,
whereas the slope of the longer diagonal line decreases. Thus, a higher amount at stake c.p.
increases the number of combinations of the parameters qP and qD that lead to trial, whereas







































In the upper left triangle of ﬁgure 5, labeled as a), both litigants are overly
optimistic. Therefore, they would meet in court regardless of whether a FORIS
contract has been made or not. However, the FORIS contract increases P’s
expected payoﬀ by ∆S. Thus, a FORIS contract would be beneﬁcial for P if
(1−µ)qPY > qPY −(1−qP)G or, equivalently, µqPY < (1−qP)G: the agreed
share for F must not be “too high”. F, on the other hand, will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to make a contract with P if µqPY − (1 − qP)G > 0. Obviously, there is no
room for a contract between P and F. Thus, the equilibrium path under the
parameters deﬁning a) is (no contract, no settlement, trial).
The next case is represented by the small triangle labeled b). Here, the parties
would settle in the absence of a FORIS contract, and P’s payoﬀ would be ˆ S.
However, under a FORIS contract P proceeds to court, which leads to an ex-
pected payoﬀ of (1−µ)qPY . P ﬁnds a FORIS contract beneﬁcial if this exceeds
the settlement payoﬀ ˆ S he receives without a FORIS contract. The condition
for F to ﬁnd a contract beneﬁcial is µqPY > (1−qP)G. It is easy to show that
these conditions, if they are simultaneously true, imply qP > G/(Y + G) + qD,
which contradicts the conditions for case b).23 Since a FORIS contract cannot
settlements are more seldom.
23(1 − µ)qPY > ˆ S is equivalent to µqPY < 0.5[qP(Y − G) − qDY + (1 − qP)G]. With
µqPY > (1 − qP)G, these conditions imply 0.5[qP(Y − G) − qDY + (1 − qP)G] > (1 − qP)G,
which is equivalent to qP(Y − G) − qDY + (1 − qD)G > 2(1 − qP)G. Rearrangement leads to
12be mutually beneﬁcial for P and F under the parameter constellation b), the
subgame perfect equilibrium path is (no contract, settlement ˆ S).
In the upper right area of ﬁgure 5, denoted as c), the parties settle in both
games 1 and 2. The FORIS contract only increases the settlement result to
ˆ SF instead of ˆ S. P receives (1 − µ)ˆ SF, which is beneﬁcial if (1 − µ)ˆ SF > ˆ S
or µ < ∆S/ˆ SF. For F, any positive share µ > 0 would be beneﬁcial. Thus, a
non-empty range of values for µ exists that make the FORIS contract beneﬁcial
for both F and P. The subgame perfect equilibrium path of Game 2 therefore is
(contract, settlement ˆ SF).
In the large lower right area labeled d), the parties would settle if a FORIS
contract has been signed. Without it, the case has NEV and therefore P’s
payoﬀ is zero. Thus, any µ ∈]0,1[ is agreeable to P and F. The subgame perfect
equilibrium path is (contract, settlement ˆ SF).
In the small triangle e) at the lower left side of ﬁgure 5, the parties do not settle
in either Game 1 or Game 2, but for diﬀerent reasons: In Game 1, the parties do
not settle since the trial has NEV. In Game 2, P would proceed to trial anyway.
If F and P do not expect a settlement, then there is no bilateral gain from a
FORIS contract. Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium path is (no contract,
no settlement, no trial).
The reasoning concerning cases a), b), and e) leads to our third result:
Result 3: In Game 2, a FORIS contract is mutually beneﬁcial for
F and P if, and only if, the litigants P and D come to a settlement in
the subsequent game. There is no cooperation rent between F and
P if P proceeds to court for sure, or if neither settlement, nor trial
occurs.
In the areas a), b), and e), the parties are expected to proceed to court even with
a FORIS contract, an outcome that prevents the contract from being mutually
beneﬁcial for F and P. Only the parameter constellations represented by the
areas c) and d) allow for the prediction that a FORIS contract would be made.
In these areas, the trial condition (6) does not hold. Thus, we have derived our
fourth result:
Result 4: In Game 2, a FORIS contract is mutually beneﬁcial for
F an P if, and only if, qP < qD(Y + G)/Y . Then, the parties D
and P come to a settlement result ˆ SF which exceeds the settlement
result without a FORIS contract, ˆ S.
In case d), the FORIS contract is necessary to induce a settlement, whereas in
case d) the contract only increases the settlement result. Note that the cases
c) and d) include all types of plaintiﬀs from qP = 0 up to qP = 1. No value of
qP(Y + G) > G + qD(Y + G), implying case a).
13qP is excluded by the plaintiﬀ’s interest in a FORIS contract. Thus, a rational
(Bayesian) judge cannot infer from the existence of a FORIS contract anything
about the plaintiﬀ’s subjective belief regarding the chances of his case.
In the areas a), b) and e), the existence of FORIS has no impact on the outcome
of the game, since P would proceed to trial after having made a contract. Again,
these areas cover all possible values of qP. Therefore, a rational judge cannot
infer from the non-existence of a FORIS contract the plaintiﬀ’s type. These
insights lead to our next result:
Result 5: If, in Game 2, a rational judge is able to observe whether
a FORIS contract has been made or not, this does not allow him to
infer anything regarding the plaintiﬀ’s subjective estimation of his
chances at trial, qP.
2.4 FORIS contracts also after settlement
In 2.3, we analyzed the parameter values under which making a FORIS contract
is part of the plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium behavior. In these cases, F captures a sure
gain: whenever it is mutually beneﬁcial for F and P to make a FORIS contract,
a settlement is triggered and F does not actually have to bear the risk of having
to pay litigation costs. However, F’s position changes dramatically if potential
customers are allowed to start settlement negotiations before agreeing a FORIS
contract.













Figure 6 shows the event tree of Game 3. First, the parties P and D bargain
14over a settlement. If they agree upon a payment, now denoted as T, then the
payoﬀs for P, D, and F are [T,−T,0]. If the parties fail to settle immediately,
then they enter Game 2 as described in the previous section. Game 2 is now a
subgame of Game 3, and was already shown to have four possible outcomes:
1. In parameter constellation a) of ﬁgure 5, no FORIS contract is made and
the case is resolved in court. If this is the course of action in the later game
then the parties also have no incentive to settle during the ﬁrst stage.
2. In parameter constellation b), the parties would later come to a settlement
without making a FORIS contract. This implies that they, in the ﬁrst
stage of Game 3, would agree upon the same settlement as in Game 2.
3. In parameter constellation e), no contract is made, no settlement occurs
and the plaintiﬀ does not proceed to trial. Thus, there is no incentive to
settle in the ﬁrst round of Game 3.
4. In parameter constellations c) and d), a FORIS contract is made and a
settlement is induced.
Therefore, only the parameter constellations c) and d) require further analysis
in this subsection. If qP > qD(Y + G)/G then the equilibrium path in Game 2
includes a FORIS contract and a settlement ˆ SF. Now, in Game 3, a settlement
result during stage 1 (denoted as T) is bilaterally beneﬁcial, hence acceptable,
if T < SF and T > (1−µ)SF. This bargaining range is non-empty for any value
of µ > 0. This leads to our ﬁnal result:
Result 6: In Game 3, the parties P and D have an incentive to
settle in the ﬁrst round if, and only if, they would settle after a
FORIS contract between F and P had been made.
Thus, the mere existence of FORIS already has an impact on the parties’ behav-
ior: the opportunity to make a FORIS contract if settlement would fail in the
ﬁrst stage of the game provides an incentive to settle immediately, and thereby
circumvent the FORIS contract. In doing so, the parties can save the share
that F would collect, and distribute it among themselves. It is the shadow of
the FORIS contract that shifts the settlement result upwards (from P’s point
of view), even when FORIS is left out of the game actually played.
3 Results and Discussion
A FORIS contract is a device that can make contingent fees compatible with
fee shifting (according to the British cost allocation rule). If a FORIS contract
is concluded, this turns NEV claims into credible threats and thereby induces
15positive settlement payments. If the litigants were also induced to settle the case
without a FORIS contract, then the contract increases the settlement result for
the plaintiﬀ. Hence, certain received wisdom about the eﬀect of FORIS AG
may be incorrect, according to which a FORIS contract only makes sense if the
plaintiﬀ does not have any money to pursue his case, or if he is totally risk-
averse.24 The truth is: in our model even a risk-neutral, wealthy plaintiﬀ can
achieve a better settlement result by concluding a FORIS contract.
If FORIS commits itself on accepting cases only before the start of the settlement
negotiations, then there can be a gain from such a contract for both the plaintiﬀ
and FORIS. Without such a commitment, FORIS faces the risk of being left out
of the game, while the plaintiﬀ takes proﬁt from the mere possibility of making
a contract with FORIS. The players would come to a settlement agreement ”in
the shadow” of this threat, and FORIS would remain away from the equilibrium
path, with zero payoﬀ.
FORIS is obviously of interest even for a risk-neutral plaintiﬀ. Re-allocation
of risk is not the only eﬀect of FORIS, it also has a strategic impact on settle-
ment negotiations. This strategic impact consists of two eﬀects: either, FORIS
contracts only increase the settlement result drawn from the defendant, or (in
NEV cases) the threat to sue is made credible by the FORIS contract, which is
necessary to motivate the defendant to accept a settlement at all.
Hence, FORIS provides an example of strategic insurance, as well as risk-
insurance.25 However, this strategic impact requires the revelation of the con-
tract’s existence to the defendant. Therefore, this business opportunity would
be foregone if FORIS observed the non-revelation clause in its standard contract.
One argument in favor of this clause is not supported by our results: this is
because a rational judge is unable to infer the plaintiﬀ’s subjective probability
of prevailing from the observation of a FORIS contract. However, even if it were
true that the plaintiﬀ’s prospects in court could be damaged when the judge
learned that a FORIS contract had been made, then perhaps FORIS should
oﬀer two types of contracts - one with the non-revelation clause, the other
without it. This would leave it to the customers to make the decision between
better chances in court on the one side, and a better bargaining position in the
settlement negotiations on the other hand. Of course, it may also be noted that
the presence of a FORIS contract may send a positive (as opposed to negative)
signal about case strength: would FORIS be willing to take on cases (in practice)
whose merits are so low that they expose it to signiﬁcant risk? Clearly the
presence of this clause warrants further examination. For instance, it would be
useful to analyze explicitly the potential signaling role that the presence of a
FORIS contract can have in a signaling model like Reinganum/Wilde (1986)
24See Finanztest (2000, 70).
25See Kirstein (2000) who analyzes Legal Cost Insurance as an example of a “strategic
insurance” for both plaintiﬀs and defendants. See also van Velthoeven/van Wijck (2001)
on the welfare eﬀects of Legal Cost Insurance, if its availability is limited to plaintiﬀs.
16There are a number of other ways in which the model we have presented can be
extended. To begin with, economic models of pre-trial bargaining have, since
Bebchuk (1984), assumed the presence of asymmetric information between the
parties. This typically prevents cases from necessarily settling when gains from
trade are present. Heyes/Rickman/Tzavara (2001) analyze such a model in
the presence of Legal Cost Insurance, and it would be valuable to see how the
current results carry over to that setting. This would also allow for an analysis
of how FORIS contracts might aﬀect the plaintiﬀ’s credibility constraint, as
analyzed by Nalebuff (1987).
One might also ask how FORIS aﬀects the dynamics of settlement negotiations
in a model such as Spier (1994) to examine the inﬂuence of FORIS contracts
on the amount and timing of settlement.26 It may also be fruitful to model
the impact of FORIS contracts on the incentives of attorneys that represent the
parties.
In our model, the starting point was a given conﬂict and a legitimate claim
of P. Finally we should ask how the presence of an institution such as FORIS
can inﬂuence the ex-ante behavior of the parties. A model that starts with the
decisions that cause the conﬂict, taking into account the possibility of oppor-
tunistic suits, could be used to analyze whether FORIS has an impact on this
underlying behavior.27
Clearly, the issue of Legal Cost Insurance and related institutions has consider-
able potential for further economic analysis. What is more, with some European
countries seeking to reduce public expenditures on legal aid, and replace private
insurance alternatives, the insights that such analysis may generate are likely
to inform an increasingly important policy debate.
26Rickman (1999) presents a dynamic model of pre-trial bargaining with contingent fees.
27See Kirstein/Schmidtchen (1997) on the impact of legitimate and opportunistic suits
on contractual behavior. The authors, however, do not consider settlement and insurance.
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